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  2  Abstract
* 
 
  In this paper we ask whether corporate governance practices at the firm 
level within a single country affect these firms’ market valuation.  This question is 
crucial in assessing the potential benefits for firms of changing their own 
practices, even though they cannot affect their country’s rules.  In particular, the 
Chilean case presents at least three interesting features that make its study 
especially relevant for other emerging economies.  First, the Chilean corporate 
structure presents highly concentrated ownership, widespread use of pyramid 
structures to separate cash from control rights and opaque ultimate ownership 
identification.  Second, an amendment to the Securities Market Law and the 
Corporations Law was recently passed with the intention of improving improve 
corporate governance in Chile.  Finally, the Chilean capital market is relatively 
developed, with more than two decades of substantial participation by 
institutional investors.  
 
  We perform regression analysis of measures of firm performance and 
payout policy on corporate governance indicators at the firm level and a series of 
control variables.  We carefully check that our results are not due to omitted 
variable bias or to particular specification and samples through an extensive 
robustness check.  We also control for reverse causality using two features of 
Chilean Corporations Law that provide an exogenous instrument for some of the 
corporate governance practices of Chilean firms.  We find that firms that present 
higher coincidence between cash and control rights tend to be consistently more 
valued by the market.  We interpret this result as an indication that potential 
conflicts of interest between controllers and minority shareholders are penalized 
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  4  1. Introduction  
 
The growing interest in corporate governance practices around the world has also reached Latin 
America, both from positive and normative perspectives.  In the case of Chile, the large and 
controversial control premiums, paid in several acquisitions of controlling stakes of flagship 
Chilean companies by foreign companies, have triggered legal reform and raised investor 
awareness of the problem.  In spite of this recent interest, and the relative development of 
Chilean capital markets in comparison with other countries of the region, corporate governance 
in Chile is far from perfect.  Although recent studies such as Klapper and Love (2002) and Lefort 
and Walker (2003b) provide some approximate indicators, a major problem remains in that we 
do not have a precise measure of the relative strength of our governance mechanisms or of their 
importance in explaining firm value and performance. 
A standard framework to analyze corporate governance practices is provided by the 
OECD principles.  These principles acknowledge not only the importance of legal protection, but 
also that of other mechanisms of corporate governance.  The principles are classified in five 
categories that encompass shareholders’ rights, board responsibilities and disclosure of 
information, among other concerns.  Based on the analysis of the Chilean legal framework, 
market participants’ opinions and conglomerate structure, Lefort and Walker (2003a) show that, 
according to a preliminary review of corporate governance practices in Chile, 11 out of the 16 
OECD principles reviewed are adequately complied with, for a compliance rate of 69 percent.  In 
addition, Klapper and Love (2002) construct corporate governance indices using information 
produced by Credit Lyonnais Securities Asia for a list of 25 emerging economies.  They find 
that, using a sample of 12 Chilean firms, Chile scores one of the highest values of the sample 
considered (61.63 percent).  However, these authors also find that the two Latin American 
economies considered (Chile and Brazil) present the lowest correlation between firm 
performance and governance quality.  These are not the only studies that find that Chile scores 
well in corporate governance measures.  Using the La Porta, López-de-Silanes, Shleifer and 
Vishny (1999a, henceforth referred to as LLSV) anti-director rights index, Chile would score 5 
on a 6-point scale.  
The fact that Chile scores relatively well in corporate governance measures, compared to 
other emerging economies, and the early development of its capital market (fueled in part by the 
early reform to its pension system) in comparison to most Latin American economies, makes the 
  5  study of the effect of corporate governance measures on corporate performance in Chile an 
interesting subject for the region. 
In particular, the Chilean case presents at least three interesting features that make its 
study especially relevant in terms of policy recommendations for this country and others in the 
region.  First, Chilean corporate structure is characterized by highly concentrated ownership, 
widespread use of pyramid structures to separate cash from control rights, and opaque ultimate 
ownership identification.  Second, from the legal point of view, the Chilean system has a civil 
origin with non-existent self-regulation practices regarding capital markets although recently, an 
amendment to the Securities Market Law and the Corporations Law, better known as the OPA 
Law, was passed with the intention of improving corporate governance in Chile.  Finally, the 
Chilean capital market is relatively developed, with more than two decades of substantial 
participation by institutional investors.  
Accordingly, this paper has two main objectives.  First, we build an extensive database at 
the firm level comprising standard corporate governance charter measures.  The database 
includes two different types of data.  The first type is drawn from a corporate governance survey 
of principal executives and board members of over one hundred listed companies in Chile.  As a 
result, we gathered over sixty binary-type parameters measuring transparency, accountability and 
other aspects of corporate governance as of the year 2003.  The second type of data is drawn 
from a panel of several quantitative variables measuring ownership structure, separation of cash 
and control rights, payout policy and market valuation plus a list of firm specific characteristics, 
annually, for the period 1990-2002 for all listed companies in Chilean stock markets.  For that 
purpose, we have carefully identified conglomerate structures in Chile and built consolidated 
financial statements at the conglomerate level. 
Second, we perform panel data regression analysis to estimate the impact of these 
corporate governance variables on corporate valuation and payout policy in Chile.  This is in line 
with the surge of empirical research on corporate governance following the seminal work of 
LLSV during the 1990s.  The original research investigated whether specific legal arrangements 
related to investor protection in different countries affected capital markets development.  The 
focus of this paper is a related question.  Here we ask whether corporate governance practices at 
the firm level within a single country affect these firms’ market valuation.  This question is 
crucial in assessing the potential benefits for firms of change their own practices, even though 
  6  they cannot affect their country’s rules.  As more empirical studies attempt to assess this 
question, the understanding of the difficulties entangled in the task improves.  Even if firm-level 
corporate governance practices correlate with share prices, we cannot be sure that these practices 
cause investors to value firms more highly.  Alternative explanations related to different forms of 
endogeneity and omitted variable bias are also consistent with such empirical findings. 
In this paper, we perform regression analysis of measures of firm performance and 
payout policy on corporate governance indicators at the firm level and a series of control 
variables.  We carefully check that our results are not due to omitted variable bias or to particular 
specification and samples through an extensive robustness checkout.  We also control for reverse 
causality using two features of the Chilean Corporations Law that provide an exogenous 
instrument for some of the corporate governance practices of Chilean firms.  In summary, we 
find that firms that present higher coincidence between cash and control rights tend to be 
consistently more valued by the market.  We interpret this result as an indication that potential 
conflicts of interest between controllers and minority shareholders are penalized by the Chilean 
capital market. 
The structure of the paper is as follows. In Section 2, we describe the Chilean capital 
market and its institutional environment.  Section 3 provides a conceptual framework for the 
working hypotheses used in the paper.  Section 4 describes the paper’s extensive data-gathering 
and data compilation process.  Section 5 analyzes empirically the effect of agency problems on 
firm market valuation and payout policy, and Section 6 looks for a statistical relationship 
between good corporate governance practices and company value in Chile.  Finally, Section 7 
concludes. 
 
2.  Chilean Capital Markets and Institutional Environment: An Overview 
 
The Chilean capital market is characterized by high market capitalization and low turnover. By 
2002, approximately 250 different stocks were traded on the Santiago Stock Exchange, with a 
total market value of nearly $60 billion dollars, or 85 percent of GDP.  However, the turnover 
ratio is low and has been decreasing to 7.5 percent of market capitalization.  Capital issues have 
also decreased since 1997, averaging $1.2 billion per annum over the last five years, with only 
$270 million in 2001 or 3 percent of fixed capital formation.  De-listings have increased, and 
since 1997 there have been only two new listings in the Chilean stock market, confirming a trend 
  7  that indicates a decline in the importance of the Chilean stock market as a source of funds for 
companies.  Among the 60 most traded stocks, 68 percent of equity is held by the controlling 
shareholders. The concentration level is even higher in the case of less traded stocks.  Therefore, 
free float is around 32 percent in the case of the most traded stocks and 14 percent overall.  
However, about 25 percent of the free float is held by domestic pension funds that do not trade 
their holdings very much.  Another 25 percent of market value not held by controlling 
shareholders is held for depositary receipts.  Therefore, only between 10 and 15 percent of issued 
stocks are generally traded on the domestic stock exchange. 
Groups are the predominant form of corporate structure in Chile.  Lefort and Walker 
(2000) show that around 70 percent of non-financial listed companies in Chile belong to one of 
approximately 50 conglomerates controlling, as a group, 91 percent of the assets of listed non-
financial companies in Chile.  There is no clear decreasing trend in these figures.  Cross-holdings 
are prohibited in Chile, and dual-class shares, although allowed, are seldom used by Chilean 
corporations.  By far, the most common way of separating control from cash-flow rights in 
Chilean conglomerates is through simple pyramid schemes.  The 1986 Banking Law imposed 
restrictions on related lending and prohibited banks from owning shares of corporations.  These 
regulations have notably decreased the importance of banks for conglomerates. 
On the other hand, institutional investors are very important in Chilean securities 
markets.  The main institutional investors are pension fund managers, with over $35 billion in 
assets, and insurance companies, managing $12 billion in assets.  Although pension funds were 
allowed to invest in equity only after 1985, during the 1990s the value of their stock holdings 
reached a peak of more than 30 percent of the total market value of pension funds.  Because the 
Chilean pension fund system is mandatory and of the “defined contribution” type, several capital 
market regulations have pursued the development of an adequate capital market where pension 
funds could safely and efficiently channel retirement savings.  In addition, the authorities have 
developed appropriate supervision institutions that control compliance with this regulatory 
framework. 
The Securities Market Law and the Corporations Law comprise the legal framework 
governing capital markets and the actions of listed companies in Chile.  The main body of both 
the Corporations Law and the Securities Law was written in 1981.  They were both amended in 
1989 and more deeply in 1994.  More recently both laws were amended by the Law Nº 19,705 of 
  8  year 2000 known as the Corporate Governance Law.  In 2001 the Securities Market Law was 
again amended.  Although the Chilean legal system follows the tradition of French Civil Law, 
the Securities Market Law and the Corporations Law were written and reformed on the basis of 
their counterparts in the United States. However, as the Chilean judiciary does not enjoy the 
same flexibility as exists under Common Law, some tension arises between the spirit of the law 
and its application.  In addition sharp differences in ownership concentration, market liquidity 
and law enforcement between Chile and the United States persist, and convergence is not 
evident. 
Three main supervisory entities overlook different aspects of financial markets in Chile: 
the Superintendency of Securities and Insurance (SVS), the Superintendency of Banks and 
Financial Institutions (SBIF), and the Superintendency of Pension Fund Managers (SAFP).  The 
Central Bank also participates actively in the financial system regulatory and supervisory 
process, especially in issues regarding international transactions and foreign market participants.  
The main supervisory entity, the SVS, was created in 1980 as an autonomous public organization 
related to the Chilean Finance Ministry.  It regulates all issuers of securities, the stock exchanges, 
the insurance industry and all capital market participants, with the exception of pension fund 
managers and banks.  The Superintendent is chosen by the President.  More than 200 people 
work at the SVS, and recently the SVS received a budget increase in order to improve its 
enforcement capacities. 
Self-regulation is not important in Chilean capital markets.  Regulations are imposed by 
the appropriate authorities, in the Civil Law tradition.  Public corporations must be registered at 
the Securities Registrar administered by the SVS.  In Chile, all shares are registered.  At the 
moment of the initial public offering, a public corporation must sell at least 10 percent of its 
registered shares.  As a continuing obligation, listed companies must provide all relevant 
information to the SVS in a timely fashion and prepare quarterly financial statements, which 
must be externally audited in December.  The stock exchanges impose no additional 
requirements on listed companies.  However, they may stop transactions at any time provided 
that there is reasonable suspicion of the existence of relevant information not disclosed to the 
market.   The stock exchange must inform the SVS within 24 hours, and transactions may be 
suspended for up to 5 days. 
  9  The SVS has taken the lead in recent reforms promoting minority shareholder protection 
and more disclosure.  In December of 2000, the Securities Market Law and the Corporations 
Law were amended.  The amendment, known as the Corporate Governance Reform, introduced 
changes in five areas of the law.  First, the market for control was regulated, requiring 
transactions involving changes of control to be performed through a tender offer under a version 
of the equal opportunity rule.  Second, the regulator increased the information and disclosure 
requirements for listed corporations, especially in the case of transactions with related parties.  
Third, large listed corporations were required to form a committee with a majority of board 
members not related to the controlling shareholder; the functions of this committee were 
specified by law.  Fourth, share repurchases were allowed in order to implement stock option 
packages as an incentive to executives.  Fifth, equal treatment of foreign shareholders was 
guaranteed by law, especially in matters regarding voting procedures.  The amendments included 
a transitional rule that allowed firms to postpone the adoption of the new regulations regarding 
changes of control for three years.  Most large companies have filed for the transitional rule.  
Additionally, the SVS is promoting the adoption of a Best Practices Code for Corporate 
Governance and the creation of an Institute of Directors. 
 
3.  Conceptual Framework and Working Hypothesis  
 
3.1.  Conglomerates, Corporate Governance and Company Valuation 
 
It is well known by now that, contrary to popular belief, the standard Bearle and Means (1936) 
firm characterized by dispersed ownership is a rare phenomenon in most economies (LLSV, 
1999b). In fact, most firms in emerging economies are linked in some way or another to an 
economic group or conglomerate that exercises tight control over the firm and owns a large 
fraction of its shares.   
As a consequence, a growing literature in corporate governance and corporate strategy 
has shifted its focus away from the standard agency problem between managers and dispersed 
shareholders in favor of examining the relationship between minority and majority shareholders.  
This is especially relevant in the case of emerging economies such as Chile.  In particular, it has 
been argued that concentrated structures or economic groups are prone to carry inefficient 
investments and generate minority shareholder expropriation, especially when the controlling 
shareholders of these groups exercise control through complex mechanisms such as pyramid 
  10  schemes, cross-holdings and dual-class shares.  In those cases, the agency problem is 
exacerbated because, on the one hand, ownership concentration insulates the controller from the 
market for corporate control, and on the other hand, control is exercised by a shareholder that 
holds a relatively small fraction of the cash-flow rights (see Bebchuk, 1998; Bebchuk et al., 
1999; and Wolfenzon, 1999).  An incomplete list of papers analyzing the effect of 
conglomeration in corporate governance and firm performance in emerging economies includes 
Khanna and Palepu (1999), Ghemawat and Khanna (1998), Lefort and Walker (1999b, 2000) and 
Lefort (2004) for the case of Chile, Valadares and Leal (2000) for Brazil, Castaneda (2000) for 
Mexico, Khanna and Palepu (1999a, b, c) for India, and Claessens et al. (1999, 2000) for most 
East Asian economies (and Chile). 
Interestingly, many of these studies recognize that one of the most salient characteristics 
of conglomerates in emerging economies is that they are persistent in time and able to adapt to 
most changing situations.  Khanna and Palepu (1999) for India and Chile and Lefort and Walker 
(1999b) for Chile have shown that conglomerates have been able to grow and increase their 
scope and self-intermediation practices even during times of fierce economic reform and 
deregulation.  This kind of evidence has supported a more favorable view of conglomerates in 
emerging economies, suggesting that economic groups are a natural and efficient way for firms 
to deal with imperfect capital markets, poor institutions, corruption and other imperfections that 
plague emerging economies.
1  In this context, economic groups arise in order to fill the voids left 
by (or to take advantage of) poor institutions.  In particular, internal capital markets, that is, the 
headquarters allocation of funds to the different business units of the conglomerate, creates value 
in a credit-constrained world (see Stein, 1997).  Other financial synergies arise because of 
conglomerates’ option of liquidating the assets of specific units in response to a general 
downturn (Shleifer and Vishny, 1992), and because of risk diversification that might be valuable 
to investors in economies with imperfect capital markets.  There are also operational synergies 
generated through conglomeration.  They might be related to economies of scale and scope in 
product and factor markets arising because of poor basic services like power provision or postal 
delivery. Groups may enjoy an additional advantage in settings where consumer protection is 
poor and group branding provides an advantage. One of the most-cited reasons for 
conglomerates in emerging markets is the advantage they create in dealing with a corrupt 
                                                           
1 See Khanna and Palepu (1997). 
  11  government, a highly regulated economy and a poor judiciary system (Khanna and Palepu, 
1997). 
We have now a better understanding of the ownership and control structure of firms in 
most emerging economies, and we have at least two competing conceptual frameworks in order 
to explain the costs and benefits of conglomerates in emerging markets.  It is not surprising, then, 
that an empirical literature has developed to try to ascertain whether affiliation with a 
conglomerate constitutes good news for investors.  Some of the most important contributions 
trying to explain the performance of business groups in emerging markets include Khanna and 
Palepu (1999a, 1999b), who find that group affiliation improves firm economic performance in 
India and Chile.  They also find that the degree of diversification of the conglomerate increases 
performance only after it has reached a certain threshold. In addition, Khana and Palepu (1999c) 
find that in Chile and India the performance of groups increased after economic reform was 
performed, indicating that part of the benefits of affiliation are not related to poor economic 
environment.  Khanna and Rivkin (2000) look at firms in 18 emerging economies, finding that 
affiliated firms perform better in six countries, worse in three and equally in five.  They also find 
that returns of firms belonging to the same conglomerate tend to move more closely when 
compared to other firms.  Claessens, Djankov and Klapper (2000) find that East Asian group 
structures are used to diversify risks, while Claessens et al. (2000) show that East Asian firms 
affiliated with conglomerates present a 4 percent average value discount, and that this discount 
arises in firms whose owners have more voting than cash-flow rights.   Thomsen and Pedersen 
(2000) look at the 435 largest European companies and find that ownership concentration has a 
non-linear relationship with performance, where too much concentration reduces performance.  
Lefort and Walker (2002) find preliminary evidence for Chile that firm affiliation with a group 
tends to decrease firm value, and that this effect is partially reduced when there is little 
separation between cash-flow and control rights. 
Recently, Klapper and Love (2002) use firm data for over 400 companies in 25 emerging 
economies to show that good corporate governance practices are highly correlated with firm 
market valuation.  Their study also indicates the importance of legal protection.  It turns out that, 
although firm-level corporate governance practices tend to be worse in countries with poor legal 
protection, they make a more important difference in terms of individual market valuation.   
  12  Similar results for a developed economy such as the United States are provided by Gompers, 
Ishii and Metrick (2001). 
  
3.2.  Corporate Governance and Payout Policy 
 
The major objective of adequate corporate governance practices is the satisfactory compensation 
of company shareholders.  Under the assumptions of the original Modigliani-Miller irrelevance 
theorems, dividend policies are irrelevant for company value and shareholder wealth.  However, 
under asymmetric information, there are several hypotheses that can be raised to relate corporate 
governance practices and payout policy in the context of the agency problem inherent to a 
modern corporation.  On the one hand, LLSV (1999a) have argued that a specific dividend 
policy is the result of the pressure exercised by minority shareholders in order to force insiders to 
pay cash.  Under this view, more investor protection should be associated with a more generous 
payout policy to shareholders.  On the other hand, La Porta et al. (1999a) and Kathryn et al 
(1998) argue that the association could go the other way around in that insiders would be paying 
high dividends in order to obtain a good reputation.  High dividends would thus act as a 
compensatory policy at the firm level.  In this case, more and better shareholder rights will 
reduce the need to establish an individual good reputation; this implies lower dividend levels.  
This family of theories of dividend policies is refereed sometimes as the rent-seeking theory 
(Gugler and Yurtoglu, 2002). 
  More traditional theories of the relevance of dividend policies under asymmetric 
information emphasize the signaling importance of payout policies with respect to future cash 
flows in the company.  An example of this line of thought is provided by Barhati, Gupta and 
Nanisetty (1998), who show how dividend policies can be used by insiders to give signals to the 
market regarding the company’s prospects of futre profits. A related theory of dividend policy 
determinants is the catering theory (Baker and Wurgler, 2002) that is related to the presence of 
uninformed investors and the existence of a dividend-driven stock premium. 
  In the context of an emerging economy, such as Chile, that presents high ownership 
concentration and extensive use of conglomerates and pyramid structures, the rent-seeking 
theory of the effect of agency problems on payout policies seems to be especially relevant.  
Large and controlling shareholders have the incentives and the power to extract private benefits 
of control at the expense of the minority shareholders, because they receive the full benefits but 
  13  only bear a fraction of the cost.  In that context, a dividend payment guarantees equal treatment 
to all shareholders.  Gurgler and Yurtoglu (2002) hypothesize that, under the rent-seeking view 
of dividend payments, an increase in dividends implies that there is less cash available for 
expropriation and therefore an abnormally positive return.  Their results support this hypothesis, 
since dividend reductions in companies with higher ownership concentration generate larger 
negative wealth effects. 
  Other papers have tested the rent seeking hypothesis of dividends.  Following La Porta et 
al. (1999b), Faccio et al. (2001), Mario and Pajuste (2002) and Gugler and Yurtoglu (2002) test 
this hypothesis for the cases of companies of Western Europe, Asia, Finland and Germany.  In 
general, the evidence is supportive of the hypothesis indicating that firms that have a strong 
controlling shareholder tend to present lower payout ratios.  This effect is mitigated when there is 
a second blockholder in the company. 
 
 
4.  Data Sources and Corporate Governance Measures 
 
4.1    Data Sources 
 
We have used several data sources.  Complete accounting and financial information were 
provided by the FECUS plus database prepared by the Santiago Stock Exchange for all listed 
companies.  In some cases it was necessary to either contact firms directly or to use other public 
records in order to complete missing information. The FECUS Plus database also provides 
information about main shareholders, board members and a set of corporate features and 
policies.  Some historical market information for listed companies was obtained from 
ECONOMATICA or directly from the Santiago Stock Exchange.  The SVS (main supervisory 
entity) provided data on corporate actions and material information reported to the SVS.  We 
have also used the “Official Gazzette Database” (Diario Oficial) in order to identify the different 
investment companies used by conglomerate ultimate owners to control firms.  This is an 
important input in the conglomerate consolidation procedure.    
In addition, we sent a questionnaire on corporate governance practices to officers and 
board members of over 200 listed companies in Chilean stock markets.  The questionnaire 
consisted of 67 questions and was constructed as an adaptation to the Chilean market of the 
CLSA questionnaire used by Klapper and Love (2002). 
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4.2.    Ownership and Control Structures of Chilean Listed Firms 
 
A crucial aspect of corporate governance mechanisms in Chile has to do with ownership 
structure.  Conglomeration and widespread use of pyramids to separate cash from control rights 
constitutes an important measure of incentives structure and of the likelihood of agency costs.  
We have revised and expanded the Lefort and Walker (2000) database considering the universe 
of Chilean corporations registered with SVS for the years 1990-2002.  The final database 
comprises almost 200 public companies listed at least one year during the period considered.  We 
analyzed the balance sheets and shareholder identification information submitted by these firms 
to the SVS, and used this information jointly with the Diario Oficial Database to build the 
“ownership chains” that characterize Chilean conglomerates through a detailed analysis of 
groups’ direct and indirect holdings in each corporation.  Through this procedure we obtained 
consolidated economic balance sheets at the group level, allowing us to avoid double counting 
all related investments. We also constructed market value balance sheets at the individual firm 
level.  These calculations are essential in producing correct measures of firm economic 
performance and value, and in constructing measures of separation of cash flow rights to control 
rights. 
The first step in building ownership chains consists of identifying corporations associated 
with specific conglomerates.  We use the same definition of groups as in Lefort and Walker 
(2000) and apply it to the years 1991, 1992, 1993, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002 and 
2003.  In this procedure we consider a list of 50 different economic groups of very diverse nature 
in terms of size, number of public companies controlled, identity of the controlling shareholder, 
and other dimensions. In using this definition, we exclude groups that are only comprised of 
“closed” (non-public) companies that are not consolidated by any public company.  It may well 
be the case that a group in our sample has only two public companies.  Obviously, in some cases 
we have not been able to consolidate the non-public companies belonging to the groups in the 
sample.  In spite of this consideration, this study adds a considerable amount of new information 
with respect to previous studies on conglomerates for Chile. 
The second step of the consolidation procedure is the identification of all linkages 
between companies controlled by a group.  In most cases, these companies are linked through 
pyramid schemes that must be properly identified in order to avoid double counting group assets.  
  15  As Lefort and Walker (2000) showed, pyramid schemes are the most common way of achieving 
control in Chilean conglomerates, since cross-holdings are forbidden by law and dual-class 
shares are relatively rare.  In order to determine minority and controlling shareholders’ 
investments in subsidiary and parent companies, we have used the information about the 12 most 
important stockholders provided by corporations to the SVS.  We have used public information 
from the “Diario Oficial” to identify the owners of investment companies among the 12 largest 
shareholders of each corporation, and associate them with different groups.  In some cases, it is 
possible that we have underestimated the controlling shareholders’ stake, since some of the 
group holdings may be realized through investment vehicles that do not appear among the 12 
largest shareholders.  However, considering that the twelfth-largest shareholder holds on average 
less than one percent of total shares, and that the 12 largest investors usually hold at least 80 
percent of the company shares, it is very unlikely that this may introduce a substantial bias.  
Through this tedious procedure we have been able to compute several entries of consolidated 
balance sheets such as controlling shareholders’ direct and indirect investments in the parent 
company and subsidiaries.  In both cases, the specific investment vehicles used by group 
members have to be identified through the official company registration in the “Diario Oficial.”  
A more detailed explanation can be obtained in Lefort and Walker (2000). 
Tables 1 and 2 summarize data on Chilean conglomerates for selected years.  Chilean 
economic groups directly control more than 70 percent of Chilean listed companies, 
corresponding to 90 percent of their assets.  This proportion has been stable for more than 13 
years, but the capital structure of Chilean companies has changed through time.  By 1990, listed 
companies controlled by economic groups presented debt-to-assets ratios of nearly 26 percent.   
Because of rising equity prices, this ratio fell to 18 percent in 1994.  As of 2002, debt-to-asset 
ratios have increased to an average of 45 percent because of both the decrease in equity prices 
after the Asian crisis of 1998 and the absolute increase in debt issues.  Firms not affiliated with  
conglomerates present much lower debt ratios.  By 2002, their debt ratios were 12 percentage 
points lower than those of affiliated companies.  
Table 2 shows the control structure of Chilean companies.  The control/tot. equity 
columns show the proportion of total equity directly and indirectly owned by the controllers of 
the companies.  These ratios increased from 52 percent to 58 percent in the case of affiliated 
firms and decreased for non-affiliated firms.  The figures were calculated considering 
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the percentage of consolidated equity held by the controllers is much larger than strictly needed 
for control.  Lefort and Walker (2000) showed that Chilean economic groups are formed on 
average by 2.5 layers of listed companies, so less than 20 percent of consolidated equity 
represents a majority in every layer of the pyramid.  The other columns measure the ratio 
between external funds (debt plus minority shareholders) and controlling shareholders’ equity.  
This relation gives an idea of the leverage of control used by the controller of the company at the 
consolidated level.  In the empirical analysis in next section we will use the inverse of this 
measure as an indicator of the degree of coincidence between cash-flow rights and control rights, 
under the assumption that the controlling shareholders hold 100 percent of controlling rights.
2 
 
4.3.  Dividend Policies and Payout Ratios in Chile 
   
In order to measure the effect of corporate governance practices and investor protection on 
dividends, we obtained annual payout ratios for over 200 listed companies from 1994 to 2002.  
The data was obtained from FECUS Plus and complemented using Economatica.  We used as an 
indicator of the dividend policy of the company the ratio between dividend payments (including 
non cash payments) in year t and after-tax earnings in year t-1.  We used this traditional measure 
even though many times paid dividends may come from earnings obtained in different years.  
In Chile, the law establishes a minimum dividend requirement of 30 percent of annual 
earnings.  The rationale for such a compensatory measure is to protect minority shareholders, as 
indicated in LLSV (1997), and implies that Chilean controllers have less freedom in determining 
and using their dividend policies.  In theory, a company could pay less than 30 percent of 
earnings if shareholders unanimously approved.
3  However, in practice, a company may pay less 
than 30 percent by declaring the dividend and postponing the payment.
4  Hence, despite the legal 
restriction it is possible to observe effective payout ratios of less than 30 percent of earnings. 
Table 3 summarizes the data collected.  Payout ratios in Chile were over 53 percent in 
1994, but steadily declined to 36 percent in 2002.  There is wide dispersion of payout ratios in 
our sample, with some companies paying over 150 percent of last year earnings.  Negative ratios 
                                                           
2 This assumption is realistic since there is only one Chilean company (Soquimich, and only since 2000) that is not 
tightly controlled by a single family, business group or other company. 
3 Corporations Law, rule 79. 
4 Corporations Law, rule 84 establishes that if dividends are postponed the amount finally paid must be adjusted by 
inflation and interest. 
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The table also shows that companies affiliated with a conglomerate have, on average, higher 
payout ratios than non-affiliated firms. 
 
4.4. Agency  Problems 
 
Corporate governance deals foremost with agency problems inside the firm.  In highly 
concentrated Chilean firms, agency problems mainly take the form of conflict of interest between 
controlling shareholders and minority shareholders.  In this paper, we explore several dimensions 
of this relationship and study their impact on firm valuation and payout policies.  
Several of the theories previously discussed maintain that agency problems between 
controllers and minority shareholders are more severe in firms affiliated with conglomerate 
structures.  However, the effect of affiliation on firm valuation is not clear as indicated by the 
different competing hypothesis with respect to it.  For instance, after controlling for separation of 
rights, affiliation with a conglomerate in emerging economies could be value enhancing due to 
internal capital markets, information sharing and other synergies.  Following Lefort and Walker 
(2000), we identify over 50 conglomerate structures in the Chilean economy operating between 
1990 and 2002 and construct a dummy variable taking the value of 1 when a company is 
affiliated with any of those structures in any given year. 
A key indicator of the potential existence of agency problems is the degree of separation 
between the cash flow rights accrued by the controller and the control rights he or she is 
exercising.  We measure separation between cash and the control rights at the firm level 
considering direct and indirect holdings of controllers and the existence of dual-class shares.  
Under agency theory, we hypothesize that higher separation is associated with lower valuation 
and lower payout.  We constructed two different indicators of the degree of coincidence between 
cash and control rights, under the assumption that the largest shareholder effectively controls all 
company assets.
5  We will analyze the validity of this assumption later on the paper.  First, we 
measure separation as the ratio between equity directly and indirectly owned by the largest 
shareholder and total consolidated assets under control of the company.   The ratio captures the 
proportion between the amount of cash flows accrued by the controllers and the total amount of 
                                                           
5 Rule 67 of Corporations Law establishes that the approval of major company decisions require the support of two 
thirds of voting shares during a shareholder meeting. The rule also establishes a mandatory tender offer requirement 
whenever a shareholder reaches the two-thirds threshold through an acquisition. 
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considers only the ratio between cash flows to controllers and cash flows to all shareholders.  In 
both cases, the assumption of total effective control by the controllers means that the percentage 
of cash flow rights is a direct indicator of coincidence.  Perfect coincidence is achieved as these 
variables approach one. 
Institutional investors have had an important role in helping to develop Chilean capital 
markets.
6  Specifically, pension fund managers can buy shares of Chilean companies that reach 
specific levels of ownership dispersion and are approved as investing vehicles by the Risk 
Classification Commission.  Hence, the presence of pension funds as shareholders of a company 
is an indication that the firm is less risky and that its governance mechanisms are more mature.  
In addition, once the pension funds reach a given level of ownership in the company, they may 
elect a board member and become an active minority shareholder.  Under the assumption that 
important institutional investors improve governance, their presence can improve performance.  
They can also be seen as the second important shareholder as in Gurgler and Yurtoglu (2002). 
 
4.5.  Corporate Governance Practices in Chile 
 
Corporate governance has many more dimensions than merely affiliation with a conglomerate 
and the degree of coincidence between cash flow rights and control rights.  In order to 
complement those measures, we conducted a survey on corporate governance practices at the 
firm level, through a 67-item questionnaire of principal officers and board members of over 200 
listed companies in Chile.  The Annex at the end of this paper shows the questions and the 
answers per question obtained.  Table 4 summarizes the main results.  The survey was conducted 
between May and September of 2004.  Questions were referred to firm practices as of the end of 
2003.  
The response rate was moderately low.  We received 59 completed questionnaires, 
representing less than 30 percent of the firms contacted.  The low response rate was relatively 
expected given the type of survey we were conducting.  However, the companies that answered 
the questionnaire tended to be the largest in terms of market capitalization, accounting for 42 
percent of total market capitalization in Chile.  Around one third of the questions in the survey 
could be directly completed using public information available from companies’ financial 
                                                           
6 See Walker and Lefort (1999). 
  19  statements and annual reports or using information made public by the SVS. We have compiled 
information through those mechanisms for an additional 47 firms, achieving a total coverage of 
106 companies, amounting to 76 percent of total market capitalization in Chile. 
The questionnaire was divided into sections on the following four areas: (i) general 
principles; (ii) the officers and board; (iii) shareholders; and (iv) disclosure and information.  
Most questions could be answered by a simple yes or no.  For all of those questions 
(approximately 55) we used an indicator variable that took the value of 1 whenever the answer 
could be associated with best practices and 0 otherwise.  In many cases, the answer was in fact 
“don’t know/no answer.”  This was the case, for instance, for companies for which the 
questionnaires were filled using sources other than officers or board members.  In fact, one third 
of the questions could not be answered using public information as detailed above.  We then 
normalized each answer between 0 and 7.  A score of seven would correspond to questions 
where all respondents received a 1 in the indicator regardless of the size of the company 
responding the questionnaire.  We then averaged the results for each section.  This procedure 
implicitly considers that each question has the same relative importance in order to measure the 
quality of a company’s corporate governance practices.  This assumption is not necessarily true 
and, hence, the average results summarized en Table 4 must be interpreted carefully.  The Annex 
provides the precise result for each question included in the questionnaire. 
Table 4 shows that, by 2003, Chilean companies scored relatively well in their corporate 
governance practices, obtaining an overall score (non-weighted) of 4.12 out of 7.  Not 
surprisingly, the worst results were obtained in the first category: general principles (2.63).  Most 
Chilean companies do not have a code or a mission statement that gives any explicit importance 
to governance practices.  The best scores are obtained in the category disclosure and information 
(5.14).  Chilean companies adequately disclose information on control, ownership and related 
party transactions.  The weakest aspects of information disclosure are promptness and the lack of 
announced targets with respect to future performance of the company.  The second category in 
the questionnaire involved officers and the board.  The average score obtained was 4.54.  The 
weakest aspect inn this category was the low participation of independent directors on company 
boards and the absence of special committees such as audit and governance committees. 
Corporation law in most Latin American countries explicitly indicates that boards are the main 
decision-making body of a company and that board members owe duty of loyalty and duty of 
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observed in most firms in the region, boards in Latin American countries tend to be much weaker 
than in the United States or United Kingdom, and constitute a poor governance mechanism.  In 
general terms, boards in Latin America mainly serve to advise controlling shareholders, as they 
have very few independent board members and few if any functioning committees.  Lefort and 
Walker (2000c) have also examined board composition and functioning in Chile and reach 
similar conclusions regarding the scarcity of truly independent directors in Chilean corporations.  
In areas related to shareholders’ rights, Chilean companies scored relatively well (4.18).  That 
was the case in the applicability of the one share-one vote rule, the general voting rights of 
minority shareholders and the absence of formal sanctions applied by the SVS to board members 
and officers. 
In order to empirically ascertain the importance of corporate governance practices in 
Chilean firms’ market valuation and payout policies, we focused on a subset of the questionnaire.  
We selected 20 questions according to the following three criteria.  They had been answered 
directly or indirectly by most companies in the sample, they capture a relevant feature of 
corporate governance practices in an emerging economy such as a Chile, and they can be 
answered by a simple yes or no.  Table 5 summarizes the results for this subset of 20 questions 
that comprise our simple index of corporate governance practices in Chile (CGI). 
Questions on the CGI were grouped in four categories: disclosure, board functioning and 
independence, shareholders rights, and conflicts of interest.  The table presents the questions and 
the original number of each question in the full-length questionnaire.  The CGI had a maximum 
score of 20, but the average score of the 106 companies surveyed was 11.3, indicating only 
mediocre performance.  Not surprisingly, the worst areas on the survey were board functioning 
and conflict of interest.  We detected a very low level of board involvement in committees.  Less 
than 5 percent of the largest firms of the country have a corporate governance committee, and 
only 14 percent had compensation or nomination committees.  In only 21 percent of the 
companies is the chairman of the board an independent and non-affiliated board member.  In 70 
percent of the boards of the largest Chilean companies there are board members whoare also 
executives or board members of other companies of the same group, indicating a high degree of 
board interlocking and lack of independence of board members.  This result is consistent with the 
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group level.  
On the other hand, large Chilean firms score relatively well in disclosure and shareholder 
rights.  Chilean legislation, especially the OPA Law approved in the year 2000, is in large part 
responsible for the rigorous disclosure of related party transactions by listed Chilean companies. 
 
5.  Empirical Analysis of the Effects of Agency Problems of Firm Market 
Valuation  
 
Empirical research on corporate governance greatly increased in the wake of the seminal work of 
LLSV during the 1990s. The original research investigated whether specific legal arrangements 
related to investor protection in different countries affected capital markets development.  This 
paper focuses on a related question. Here we ask whether corporate governance practices at the 
firm level within a single country affect these firms’ market valuation.  This question is crucial in 
assessing the potential benefits for firms of changing their own practices, even though they 
cannot affect their country’s rules.  As clearly stated by Black, Jang and Kim (2003), “to what 
extent can a firm increase its market value by upgrading its corporate governance practices, and 
to what extent is it tied to its home country’s rules and reputation?” 
As an increasing number of empirical studies try to assess this question, our 
understanding of the difficulties involved in the task improves.  Even if firm-level corporate 
governance practices correlate with share prices, we cannot be sure that these practices cause 
investors to value firms more highly.  Alternative explanations related to different forms of 
endogeneity and omitted variable bias are also consistent with such empirical findings. 
In this section of the paper, we perform regression analysis of measures of firm 
performance and payout policy on corporate governance indicators at the firm level and a series 
of control variables.  Among the indicators of firm performance, we consider firm market 
valuation using Tobin’s q and market-to-book ratios, ROA and the dividend-earnings ratio.  The 
empirical model tries to capture the hypothesis previously discussed regarding the control 
structure of the company, the extent of the agency problem at the firm level and the market value 
of the company. 
The empirical model is, therefore, of the type: 
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where: 
y: a firm performance and value indicator such as Tobin’s q, ROA, 
and dividend payout ratio. 
dgroup: affiliation to a conglomerate dummy. 
coincid: degree of coincidence between cash and control rights at 
the firm level. 
concent: ownership concentration at the firm level. 
ZF: a set of control variables at the firm level, including Tobin’s q 
in the payout equation, and time and industry dummies. 
ZG: a set of control variables at the group level. 
 
For estimation purposes we will consider three different samples because of restrictions 
on data availability.  First, we use annual panel data comprising all listed companies with a fair 
amount of trading (around 200) over a 13-years time horizon (1990-2002).  On average, this 
database supplies over 1,800 year-firm observations, allowing obtaining robust estimates using 
different estimation procedures of the relationship between agency problems and firm market 
valuation.  Secondly, we constructed a similar annual panel for the period 1994-2002, because no 
information on dividend payments was available for the period prior to 1994.  This panel 
provides over 1,100 year-firm observations.  Finally, in the next section, we additionally 
analyzed a cross-section sample of 106 large companies for the year 2003.  Although this is a 
smaller database, we use it to capture the effect of other dimensions of corporate governance 
practices affecting firm valuation and payout policies and to provide estimates of the incidence 
of corporate governance practices at the firm level on company valuation that are robust to the 
endogeneity problem.  We use the CGI (Corporate Governance Index) and its components for 
that purpose. 
 




A key concern in this type of study has to do with the potential endogeneity problem as 
discussed by Klapper and Love (2003) and Black, Jang and Kim (2003), among others.  In the 
context of this paper, the endogeneity problem would arise, for instance, if firms with high 
market valuation tended to adopt good governance practices in order to further improve their 
share prices.  In that case, part of the correlation captured in the regressions would respond in 
fact to reverse causality.  Black, Jang and Kim (2003) refers to a slightly different type of 
endogeneity referred as “optimal differences” which occurs when firms endogenously and 
optimally choose different governance practices in the sense of Demsetz and Lehn (1985).
7 
A related problem of spurious correlation could arise due to omitted variable bias.  In 
equilibrium, corporate governance likely correlates with various economic variables.  A study 
that omits some economic variables, which predict both governance and share price, could 
wrongly conclude that governance is directly associated with share price.  This problem can be 
described by observing that corporate governance practices at the firm level could be determined 
by the firm’s contracting environment.  For instance, firms with more tangible assets or more 
growth opportunities would want to improve corporate governance mechanisms in order to raise 
external finance.  In such a situation, they may decide to reduce, for instance, separation of 
control and cash flow rights or transfer control to other, maybe foreign, companies.  Hence, if we 
do not adequately control for these variables, the governance factors will capture the effect of the 
contracting environment on the firm on its market value. 
 
Panel Data Estimation 
 
The use of a panel database increases the number of observations but introduces potential biases 
into the estimation.  In order to account for unobservable individual effects, we provide fixed and 
random effects estimations in addition to the traditional pooled least squares.  Moreover, we also 
provide GLS heteroskedasticity-consistent estimators in case observations of different companies 
present different variances.  We performed Hausman tests of specification in order to choose the 
best estimations obtained. 
                                                           
7 Black, Jang and Kim (2003) offer an alternative explanation for the potential correlation: quality signaling.  The 
idea is that firms may adopt good governance rules to signal its good behavior.  In that case, the signal rather than 
the firm’s governance practices affects share prices.   
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Traditionally, payout ratio data are censored at zero since companies do not pay negative 
dividends, even if they were willing to do so.  In addition, Chilean legislation requires companies 
to pay dividends of at least 30 percent of last-year profits.  Hence, we estimated panel Tobit 
regressions in the case of payout ratios due to the censored nature of the dependent variable, and 
computed Hausman tests to evaluate the importance of the censoring problem.  
 
5.2.  Empirical Results on Agency Problems and Firm Valuation 
 
In the first part of the empirical analysis we want to explore the information contained on the 
panel data regarding the effect of agency conflicts at the firm level on its market valuation and 
payout ratios.  We take the lack of coincidence between cash flow rights and control rights as an 
indicator of conflict of interest and potential agency problems and, thus, as a proxy for bad 
corporate governance practices at the company level.  In the next subsection, we complement our 
analysis by considering indicator variables of the quality of corporate governance constructed 
from index variables derived from the questionnaire previously described. 
In order to construct our proxy for the potential existence of agency problems we 
calculated for each company the market value of the consolidated equity held by the controlling 
shareholders.  We then divide this value by the market value of assets calculated as the sum of 
the market value of total equity plus debt.  As explained before this ratio indicates the percentage 
accrued by the controllers of each dollar of assets created by the company.  We take this variable 
as an indication of the coincidence between cash flow rights and control rights and we call it 
Coincid.  We also computed a simple measure of ownership concentration as the fraction of total 
equity held by the three largest shareholders (concent). 
In order to measure firm valuation we consider three variables.  Following most of the 
empirical literature, we use Tobin’s q measured as the ratio between the sum of the market value 
of equity and book value of debt, and the book value of assets.  We also calculated the market-to- 
book ratio of equity and ROA. 
From a long list of control variables, we selected group affiliation dummy, pension fund 
dummy, debt-equity ratios (at market values), log of firm size, investment ratios, cash flow 
available, average traded volume, time dummies and 11 industry dummies.  Tables 6 and 7 
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including cross correlations. 
We want to study the effect of agency problems in the firm and its value.  A simple look 
at the correlation matrix of the variables, presented in Table 7.B, shows that higher ownership 
concentration is negatively correlated with firm valuation and that a higher coincidence between 
cash flow and control rights is positively correlated with firm valuation.  Although group 
affiliation is not correlated with the proxies to market valuation of companies, affiliation is 
positively correlated with firms’ ROA.  Figure 1 complements this evidence by presenting scatter 
plots of these relationships indicating that these results are not likely due to few outliers. 
However, as previously discussed, the correlations do not necessarily indicate causality 
because of potential endogenous relations and omitted variable bias.  We tackle the second 
problem by running multiple regressions using the set of control variables listed before.  Table 8 
presents this first set of results using standard OLS pooled multivariate regressions.  We tried 
several specifications in order to see whether our results are robust.  We found that including a 
large set of control variables does not alter the preliminary results.  In all specifications, firm 
valuation is negatively and significantly correlated with ownership concentration and positively 
and significantly correlated with the degree of coincidence of cash flow and control rights.  We 
also found that changing the set of control variables did not affect the signs and significance of 
these coefficients. 
These results tend to support the hypothesis that agency problems, characterized by a 
lesser degree of coincidence of cash and control rights in hands of company controllers, are 
penalized by the market.  Holding ownership concentration constant, more aligned incentives 
increase company value.  On the other hand, holding the relation between cash and control rights 
constant, an increase in ownership concentration can be associated with more power inn 
controllers’ hands and, potentially, more agency conflicts between controlling and minority 
shareholders.  However, the negative coefficient in the ownership concentration value could also 
be related to liquidity problems.  We will explore this possibility later in the paper using a 
measure of turnover. 
There is another important result regarding corporate governance practices and firm 
valuation.  We find that the presence of pension funds as minority shareholders increases the 
market value of listed companies.  This result is robust across different estimation procedures 
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tend to mitigate agency problems between controlling and minority shareholders. 
The results indicate that under this type of model specification group affiliation does not 
significantly affect firm value.  Both the time dummies and the industry dummies were 
statistically significant as a group in all specifications where they were included.  Also, we find 
that larger firms have a higher Tobin’s q, indicating higher market valuation, while more 
indebted firms present lower market valuation after controlling for other factors.  Both 
coefficients were statistically significant in most specifications. 
 
5.3. Robustness  Checks 
 
Tables 9 and 10 present additional results that confirm the robustness of the findings.  In Table 9 
we replicate the last regression of Table 8 using different measures of firm valuation.  The 
evidence shows that it is highly unlikely that our previous results are due to spurious correlations 
arising from measurement error in the construction of Tobin’s q and the concentration and 
coincidence variables.  The table shows that the results hold when we substitute Tobin’s q with 
the Market-to-book ratio or the firm’s ROA.  In Table 10 we show cross-section regressions for 
each of the 12 years included in the sample.  Again, the coefficient on concentration is negative 
and significant, while the coefficient on coincidence is positive and significant in each of the 12 
cross sections. 
Additional tests for robustness are presented in Table 11.  In this table we show the 
results for different econometric methods.  Among other things, we run fixed effects panel 
regressions that take care of potential unobservable firm effects that might be correlated with 
ownership concentration and rights coincidence, hence biasing our previous results.  The 
coefficients obtained are, again, very similar to those previously obtained and almost certainly 
rule out the possibility that the results are due to omitted variable biases. 
We also checked for the existence of non-linearities on the relationship between 
concentration, coincidence and valuation.  We find that introducing these variables squared does 
not substantially change the results.  We find an inverse U-shaped relation for concentration but 
no significant non-linear relation between coincidence and value after we control for ownership 
concentration.  The results are presented in Table 12. 
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Because of all these safeguards we are very confident that our results are not induced by some 
omitted variable bias.  However, we still have to tackle the potentially endogenous nature of the 
correlations obtained.  Both ownership concentration and the degree of coincidence between 
cash flow and control rights could be endogenously determined by the firm’s market valuation 
and/or performance. 
The positive coefficient obtained for the coincidence between cash and control rights 
variable can also be explained under the reverse causation story.  Endogeneity of this type would 
imply that, for a given level of control rights, the owners of firms with high Tobin’s q are more 
likely to increase their rights over the company cash flows, hence increasing the degree of 
coincidence between cash flow and control rights. Under this reverse causality, there could still 
be a causal connection between coincidence and firm value, but the OLS coefficient would 
overstate it.  Furthermore, if an endogenous relation of the type predicted by Demsetz’s 
hypothesis is present, even if there is a causal relation for some firms between coincidence and 
valuation one could not infer that other firms can improve their market values by increasing the 
degree of coincidence between rights. 
In the case of ownership concentration, it could also be argued that the controlling 
shareholders of companies more valued by the market also tend to increase the concentration of 
their holdings.  That would be the case if they increased ownership concentration through a 
pyramid scheme without necessarily increasing the coincidence between their cash and control 
rights.  In this case, however, since the coefficient on concentration is negative, the reverse 
causality correlation would run in the opposite direction and henc, would not reinforce the direct 
effect. 
In order to adequately solve the endogeneity problems we should find suitable 
instruments for running some type of instrumental variable or simultaneous equations model.  A 
suitable instrument should ideally be exogenous and not influenced by the dependent variable of 
interest.  It should be strongly correlated with the independent variable for which there is 
suspicion of endogeneity (conc and coincid), and it should predict the dependent variable only 
indirectly, through its effect on the independent variable, but not directly.  Given those 
restrictions, it should be difficult to obtain suitable instruments unless some restrictive 
assumptions are made or an exogenous condition on corporate governance practices is imposed 
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restrictive assumptions.  For that purpose, we run an Arellano and Bond Dynamic Panel GMM 
regression.  This econometric procedure takes care of unobserved firm-specific effects and 
potential endogeneity of the explanatory variables under the assumption that there is no second- 
order serial correlation on the error term.  The estimated coefficients are very similar to those 
obtained before, but a Sargan test of the validity of the instruments (lagged values of the control 
variables) largely rejects the null hypothesis. 
Because the concentration and coincidence measures present much less time series 
variation that firm valuation and performance variables, we conjecture that the endogeneity 
problem is unlikely to be very important in this case.  However, we directly tackle the 
endogeneity problem using an instrument related to control concentration.  In the previous 
analysis, we had used a measure of ownership concentration and of coincidence of cash and 
control rights.  Rule 67 of the Chilean Corporations Law establishes that major company 
decisions must be taken with the support of two- thirds of voting rights.  It could be argued, then, 
that effective control requires two-thirds of voting rights.  Figures 2.A and B show the 
relationship between a control dummy variable and the coincidence between cash and control 
rights.  Notice that, although both variables are related, the relationship is not obvious.  For 
instance, a company may have a controlling shareholder that controls with two-thirds of the 
votes a holding company that owns two-thirds of the company shares.  Therefore, the control 
concentration dummy for this company would be 1, although, even in the zero debt case, the 
coincidence between cash and control rights would be only four-ninths.  Figure 2.A shows that, 
in any case, the degree of coincidence tends to be higher in firms that surpass the two-thirds 
threshold.  Figure 2.B shows that there is no obvious clustering of firms around the two-thirds 
threshold, and that company market value does not respond in an evident way to the threshold. 
Therefore, in the following analysis we will use a dummy variable that takes the value of 
one whenever the controller of a firm holds, directly or indirectly, more than two-thirds of voting 
rights as an instrument for the coincidence of cash and control rights variable.  Table 13 presents 
OLS regressions of Tobin’s q on this dummy, the coincidence variable and a series of control 
variables under different specifications.  The results are straightforward.  When we include the 
dummy variable in our standard specification the previous results do not change.  Lower 
ownership concentration and higher coincidence are still related to higher valuation.  We then 
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and a series of controls.  We find that, as expected, firms with control concentration over two- 
thirds present higher coincidence.  A hypothesis for this result is that as a company reaches such 
a level of concentration in voting rights, it becomes very difficult for the controller to attract 
external investors in order to separate cash from control rights.  
We then run a second stage regression of Tobin’s q on all control variables and the 
instrumented coincidence variable.  Table 13 shows that the 2SLS regressions indicate that, after 
controlling for endogeneity and omitted variable bias, the coefficient on the degree of 
coincidence remains positive although the economic and statistic significance is notably reduced.  
Table 13 shows that the results hold for a similar set of regressions run for a smaller sample of 
firms after controlling for traded volumes. 
 
5.5.  Dividend Payout Ratios 
 
Tables 14 and 15 present the results for the regressions using the dividend payout ratio as the 
explanatory variable.  They are structured in a similar way as those for Tobin-s q.  In the case of 
dividend payout ratios we find inverse U-shaped relationships similar to the one obtained for the 
German case by Durtouglu et al.  The results are the following.  First, firms affiliated with 
conglomerates, firms with pension funds as minority shareholders and larger firms present higher 
payout ratios.  Second, more debt implies less dividends.  Third, separation of cash from control 
rights affects payout ratios in a non-linear way.  Similar to the German case, we find that there is 
a threshold around 45 percent where the effect of higher controlling shareholder participation 
changes the sign of the marginal effect of separation on payout ratios.  We find that, for low 
values of the coincidence variable, increases in ownership concentration, as expected, increase 
payout policy.  However, when concentration in terms of equity reaches over 70 percent of 
shares owned by the controller, payout ratios start to decrease.  A hypothesis for that result might 
be related to tax incentives.  As we already discussed, once the controller has achieved such a 
high level of ownership, he/she can do almost anything without opposition, and there may be 
better (less expensive in terms of taxes) ways of getting his/her money back. 
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Payout Policy? 
 
6.1.  Correlations with Firm Market Valuation 
 
In this section we focus on cross-section data for the year 2003 in order to include other 
dimensions of corporate governance in the empirical analysis.  We include in the analysis the 
corporate governance indicator variables constructed starting from the questionnaire and 
summarized in the CG Index described above.  As explained above, we divided the corporate 
governance index into four sections: disclosure, board practices, shareholders rights and conflict 
of interest.  In addition, we consider a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 whenever we had 
to fill in the answers to the questionnaire without company assistance, and we consider 
separately the pension fund dummy.  Of course, one might expect the different measures of 
corporate governance to be highly correlated.  In Table 16 we look at the correlations between 
the control variables used in the previous regressions and the corporate governance indicators.  
In general, the CGI index and sub-indices are positively correlated among themselves and with 
market valuation.  The sub-index of shareholders rights is the exception and presents a negative, 
but low, correlation with the other sub-indices.  Firm size is positively correlated with good 
corporate governance practices and less potential for agency problems, while the opposite is true 
for debt. 
In Table 17 we present multivariate Logit regressions between the CGI components and 
the control variables.  Larger firms, less indebted firms, firms with more growth opportunities 
and firms with larger cash flows available tend to present better corporate governance practices. 
Finally, we look at the effect of better corporate governance practices as measured by the 
CG index and its components on market valuation.   The regressions presented in Tables 18 are 
estimated over a cross-section sample of 85 companies for the year 2003.  The results are not 
very encouraging.  We find that, after controlling for the list of control variables previously used, 
only the sub-index Conflict of Interest appears to be statistically significant in explaining firm 
value, and only few questions have individual significance in the regressions.  The overall index 
is not significant, and the shareholders rights sub-index although significant, appears with a 
negative sign in the regressions.  The lack of explanatory power can be attributed to the limited 
sample used, because most of the variables that were significant in the previous panel data 
regressions are statistically insignificant in these cross section regressions.  In addition, the high 
  31  correlation observed among the different measures of corporate governance and the control 
variables may, of course, imply multicollinearity in the regressions, and hence low individual 
explanatory power. 
 
6.2.    Controlling for Endogeneity 
 
Of course, as previously discussed, even the positive and significant coefficient on the Conflict 
indicator could be due to endogeneity from reverse causality. Without knowing whether that is 
the case, we cannot affirm that these types of better corporate governance practices at the firm 
level are valued by the market.  Following Black, Jang and Kim (2003), we look for exogenous 
determinants of corporate governance practices not directly caused by firm market valuation.  
Similarly to the Korean case, Chilean Corporations Law requires that all firms with market 
capitalization above 45 million dollars form an audit committee composed by a majority of 
independent directors.
8  Presumably, firms with market capitalization above this value will tend 
to have better corporate governance practices in order to be sure that they comply with the law.  
Figure 3.A shows that, in fact, firms above this threshold present an audit committee, while the 
smaller ones do not.  As a simple way to look at the validity of this instrument, Figure 3.B shows 
that there is no apparent relationship between this size threshold and company’s market 
valuation. 
The last two columns of Table 18 show 2SLS regressions using the size dummy as an 
instrument for the CGI index in a regression of Tobin’s q on the agency problem variables and 
the set of control variables.  The results show that the second stage coefficient of conflict of 
interest on Tobin’s q remains positive and similar in value to the one obtained in an OLS 
regression indicating no evidence of endogeneity in an important way.  However, the result is 
only significant at the 15 percent level. 
 
7.  Conclusions 
 
Recent studies comparing corporate governance practices at the country level have shown that 
Chilean companies present standards comparable to those of emerging economies with higher 
levels of capital market development and per capita income.  In general, large Chilean companies 
                                                           
8 Rule 50 bis, Corporations Law. 
  32  have been characterized by corporate governance standards above those of other economies in 
Latin America.  
  The results of this paper support two complementary sets of conclusions.  First, we have 
looked at specific aspects of corporate governance practices in companies, finding that Chilean 
companies are especially good in the areas of transparency and information disclosure.  Among 
other reasons, this result might be related to early reforms in the Securities Markets and 
Corporations Law in the context of the pension fund privatization process.  There are also 
indications that more recent legal reform implemented in Chile, following what is understood to 
be the world’s best corporate governance practices, has also played a role.  Because Chile shares 
largely the same legal and political history with countries in the region, the relatively better 
standards achieved by Chilean companies mean that adequate legal reform is important in 
shaping corporate governance practices at the firm level.  Institutional investors, ADRs and 
creditors are important stakeholders in Chilean firms, and they understand that good corporate 
governance practices are valuable.  They are crucial players in translating better corporate 
governance practices into better access to capital for firms. 
  The worst aspects of Chilean corporate governance practices are related to conflict of 
interest between controlling and minority shareholders.  The results obtained from the 
questionnaires are consistent with the widespread use of pyramids as a way to separate cash from 
control rights.  Pyramids seem to be an efficient way for economic groups to exercise control 
over a wide variety of productive assets and to establish internal capital markets that compensate 
for relatively poorly developed formal markets.  However, the use of pyramids could exacerbate 
agency problems and be detrimental to the market value of companies and to the level of 
economic development of the country. 
  In this paper, we try to shed light on this issue performing regression analysis of measures 
of firm market valuation, performance and payout policy on corporate governance indicators at 
the firm level and a series of control variables.  We carefully check that our results are not due to 
omitted variable bias or to particular specification and samples through an extensive robustness 
check.  We also control for reverse causality using two features of Chilean Corporations Law 
that provide an exogenous instrument for some of the corporate governance practices of Chilean 
firms.  In summary, we find that firms that present higher coincidence between cash and control 
rights tend to be consistently more valued by the market.  We interpret this result as an indication 
  33  that potential conflicts of interest between controllers and minority shareholders are penalized by 
the Chilean capital market.  Consistently, we also find that firms scoring poorly on indicators of 
conflict of interest are less valued by the market.  Hence, company shares of firms presenting 
agency problems tend to be traded in the market at a discount, indicating that reducing conflict of 
interest and agency problems in the firm improves the conditions of access to portfolio capital. 
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  40  Figure 2.A. 
Coincidence of Cash and Control Rights and Effective 
Company's Control
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  41  Figure 3.A 
Audit Committee and Company's equity size































  42  Conglomerates
Assets Relative Assets Relative Assets Relative Assets Relative
size size size size
(MMUS$) (%) (MMUS$) (%) (MMUS$) (%) (MMUS$) (%)
Largest 4,617 22.0 9,454 14.0 16,220 23.0 11,306 20.5
5 largest 9,264 44.0 34,018 51.0 37,704 54.0 26,304 47.6
10 largest 16,784 79.0 46,316 69.0 49,357 70.0 37,008 67.0
20 largest 18,784 88.0 54,259 81.0 57,570 82.0 46,655 84.5
All conglomerates 19,422 91.0 57,973 87.0 63,957 91.0 49,729 90.0
Non-affiliated 1,841 9.0 8,879 13.0 6,059 9.0 5,511 10.0
Total 21,263 100.0 66,852 100.0 70,017 100.0 55,241 100.0
Table 1
Importance of Chilean Conglomerates
1990 1994 1998 2002
 
Conglomerates
Debt/ Equity/ Debt/ Equity/ Debt/ Equity/ Debt/ Equity/
Assets Assets Assets Assets Assets Assets Assets Assets
(%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%)
Largest 27.3 72.7 14.0 86.0 53.2 46.8 58.1 41.9
5 largest 26.6 73.4 14.7 85.3 46.0 54.0 52.9 47.1
10 largest 26.6 73.4 17.9 82.1 44.9 55.1 55.1 44.9
20 largest 25.4 74.6 18.2 81.8 45.7 54.3 54.8 45.2
All conglomerates 25.9 74.1 18.5 81.5 46.7 53.3 54.7 45.3
Non-affiliated 22.5 77.5 11.1 88.9 42.7 57.3 43.4 56.6
Total 25.6 74.4 17.6 82.4 46.4 53.6 53.6 46.4
Table 2.a
Capital Structure of Chilean Conglomerates




  43  Conglomerates
Control/ External /  Control/ External /  Control/ External /  Control/ External / 
Total eq. Control Total eq. Control Total eq. Control Total eq. Control
(%) (%) (%) (%)
Largest 55.4 1.5 63.7 0.8 18.4 10.6 49.1 3.9
5 largest 52.5 1.6 52.4 1.2 53.0 2.5 57.1 2.7
10 largest 52.9 1.6 53.2 1.3 56.0 2.2 60.2 2.7
20 largest 52.1 1.6 52.8 1.3 56.1 2.3 59.0 2.7
All conglomerates 52.3 1.6 53.6 1.3 57.0 2.3 58.8 2.8
Non-affiliated 85.3 0.5 98.0 0.1 93.5 0.9 62.8 1.8
Total 55.2 1.4 60.0 1.0 60.4 2.1 59.3 2.6
Table 2.b
Control Structure of Chilean Conglomerates








  1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Mean 0.536 0.496 0.447 0.380 0.348 0.321 0.367 0.347 0.366
Stand. Dev. 0.374 0.327 0.346 0.347 0.334 0.337 0.375 0.337 0.447
Max. 1.538 1.447 1.203 1.369 1.261 1.283 1.383 1.193 1.579







Mean 0.391 0.428 0.314
Stand. Dev. 0.366 0.366 0.353
Max. 1.579 1.538 1.579





(Summary statistics by year)







Percentage of firms 
contacted




% of Total Market 
cap
Companies contacted 206 100.0% 76.3% 81,000 98%
Filled questionnaires 59 28.6% 21.9% 35,004 42%
Direct sources 47 22.8% 17.4% 28,479 34%
Total 106 51.5% 39.3% 63,484 76%
Category: Number of questions
Average          
Score
I.      ABOUT GENERAL PRINCIPLES 72 . 6 3
II.     ABOUT OFFICERS AND THE BOARD 26 4.54
III.    ABOUT SHAREHOLDERS 20 4.18
IV.   ABOUT DISCLOSURE AND INFORMATION 14 5.14
TOTAL / AVERAGE 67 4.12
Table 4  
Questionnaire on Corporate Governance Practices: Chile, 2003
Summary of Results
(out of 7; higher score means better CG practices)


















Does the company disclose related party transactions and/or 
conflicts of interest of managers and directors on the board? 106 0 0 100.0%
22
Does the company's Annual Report include a section devoted to the 
company's performance in implementing corporate governance 
principles? 12 93 1 11.4%
35 5
Has the company been sanctioned for failure to publish company 
reports timely in the last three years? 21 0 22 98.1%
45 4 Are accounts presented according to IGAAP? 51 55 0 48.1%
56 1 Is the external auditing company internationally recognized? 101 5 0 95.3%
62 5 Does the company disclose board compensation and benefits? 98 7 1 93.3%
II Board functioning and independence 2.28
71 8 Does the company have a corporate governance committee? 51 0 01 4.8%
81 6 Does the company have an audit committee? 76 30 0 71.7%
91 4 Is the Chairman of the Board an independent, non-affiliated director? 17 63 26 21.3%
10 9 Has the board 5 to 9 members? 22 84 0 20.8%
11 21
Are there any other committees in the board (i.e. compensation, 
nomination, etc..)? 15 87 4 14.7%
12 30
Has there been any sanction to the board or management for 
violations of Securities and/or Corporations laws in the last three 
years? 51 0 10 95.3%
III Shareholders rights 2.61
13 34 Does each share have one vote? 100 6 0 94.3%
14 38 Do shareholders have to be present in the meeting to vote? 30 75 1 71.4%
15 41
Can shareholders ask management to include items in the list of 
topics to be dealt with during the shareholders' meetings? 83 17 6 83.0%
16 7 Is the company listed on a major foreign stock exchange? 13 93 0 12.3%
IV Conflict of interest 1.92
17 28
Is any board member also board members/executives of firms 
belonging to the same economic group? 68 30 8 30.6%
18 33
Is senior management remuneration tied to the value of company 
shares? 51 0 10 4.7%
19 42
Does the company disclose its ownership structure (i.e. the 
ownership by large shareholders? 102 3 1 97.1%
20 12
Do the Chairman of the Board and the CEO belong to the same 
family/controlling group? 26 39 41 60.0%
Table 5
Index on Corporate Governance Practices
Chile, 2003
  46  Tobin's q MB Ratio ROA Concent Coincid DGroup Dafp LAEC DE Ratio Cash Invest Volume
Number of obs. 1851 1820 2500 2495 1980 3081 3081 2014 1960 1899 2030 1102
Mean 1.30 1.47 5.9% 59.0% 38.0% 0.52 0.39 17.46 1.07 20.4% 6.1% 130983
Median 1.08 1.12 5.4% 61.1% 34.5% 1.00 0.00 17.58 0.40 15.7% 2.3% 3497
Max 5.00 7.40 47.0% 100.0% 99.7% 1.00 1.00 22.97 47.83 99.9% 98.0% 14400000
Min 0.40 0.04 -73.5% 0.0% 0.1% 0.00 0.00 6.82 0.00 -37.0% -39.1% 0
Stan. Deviation 0.73 1.15 8.9% 24.9% 21.5% 0.50 0.49 2.11 2.77 19.7% 18.5% 678779
Tobin's q MB Ratio ROA Concent Coincid DGroup Dafp LAEC DE Ratio Cash Invest Volume
Number of obs. 109 108 145 141 119 237 237 122 118 0 0 0
Mean 1.15 1.29 7.7% 53.9% 34.8% 0.41 0.16 16.15 1.03 . . .
Median 0.99 1.00 6.3% 54.4% 32.5% 0.00 0.00 16.38 0.42 . . .
Max 5.00 7.03 47.0% 99.8% 91.3% 1.00 1.00 20.52 10.15 . . .
Min 0.44 0.15 -31.4% 2.2% 2.2% 0.00 0.00 8.71 0.00 . . .
Stan. Deviation 0.62 1.12 10.2% 26.7% 21.3% 0.49 0.36 2.10 1.82 . . .
Number of obs. 115 112 152 147 124 237 237 126 123 122 130 0
Mean 1.60 1.96 8.7% 56.9% 41.9% 0.44 0.20 16.79 0.45 27.5% 6.3% .
Median 1.40 1.57 7.2% 57.2% 43.0% 0.00 0.00 16.93 0.25 22.2% 2.1% .
Max 4.04 6.71 35.9% 99.8% 96.3% 1.00 1.00 21.06 4.08 97.3% 90.1% .
Min 0.46 0.21 -19.3% 2.2% 2.2% 0.00 0.00 8.34 0.00 -3.9% -33.2% .
Stan. Deviation 0.84 1.38 9.7% 26.2% 21.7% 0.50 0.40 2.07 0.69 24.5% 17.8% .
Number of obs. 113 111 169 164 124 237 237 126 123 128 135 0
Mean 1.55 1.90 8.7% 58.3% 41.1% 0.48 0.27 17.02 0.52 28.6% 12.4% .
Median 1.44 1.63 8.1% 59.6% 40.1% 0.00 0.00 17.13 0.26 23.7% 5.1% .
Max 3.80 5.40 41.5% 100.0% 91.7% 1.00 1.00 21.24 13.57 99.9% 98.0% .
Min 0.55 0.41 -26.1% 2.4% 2.4% 0.00 0.00 8.34 0.00 -20.8% -32.8% .
Stan. Deviation 0.74 1.17 9.9% 26.3% 20.9% 0.50 0.44 2.01 1.29 24.3% 24.1% .
Number of obs. 116 114 179 180 125 237 237 126 124 137 147 0
Mean 1.64 2.02 8.0% 59.1% 41.2% 0.50 0.32 17.28 0.57 25.6% 8.8% .
Median 1.41 1.61 7.3% 60.0% 39.3% 1.00 0.00 17.28 0.22 24.5% 6.1% .
Max 4.10 6.49 34.1% 100.0% 92.9% 1.00 1.00 21.72 18.54 89.4% 83.0% .
Min 0.44 0.14 -17.5% 2.4% 2.4% 0.00 0.00 8.34 0.00 -32.9% -36.7% .
Stan. Deviation 0.87 1.40 8.7% 25.7% 21.0% 0.50 0.47 2.08 1.76 21.1% 16.7% .
Number of obs. 111 109 181 181 126 237 237 128 124 152 148 92
Mean 1.75 2.17 6.5% 57.9% 42.4% 0.51 0.41 17.32 1.00 24.9% 7.5% 81422
Median 1.56 1.86 6.7% 61.1% 40.4% 1.00 0.00 17.55 0.20 22.7% 3.3% 2495
Max 4.66 6.84 41.2% 99.8% 96.4% 1.00 1.00 21.99 47.83 98.7% 88.0% 2286086
Min 0.43 0.36 -73.5% 2.3% 1.7% 0.00 0.00 6.82 0.00 -30.0% -30.0% 0
Stan. Deviation 0.87 1.33 10.5% 24.2% 21.8% 0.50 0.49 2.52 4.67 20.6% 19.2% 294279
Number of obs. 115 112 192 193 126 237 237 127 124 155 161 96
Mean 1.71 2.05 7.1% 58.1% 41.8% 0.52 0.43 17.71 0.39 24.3% 8.3% 301793
Median 1.57 1.83 5.9% 61.1% 40.9% 1.00 0.00 17.83 0.23 21.1% 4.5% 4128
Max 4.92 7.40 37.3% 100.0% 97.7% 1.00 1.00 21.93 3.91 88.3% 81.4% 14400000
Min 0.52 0.37 -35.9% 2.2% 2.2% 0.00 0.00 8.38 0.00 -28.9% -38.3% 0
Stan. Deviation 0.83 1.20 8.7% 25.0% 22.1% 0.50 0.50 2.12 0.51 19.4% 18.7% 1542535
Table 6
Descriptive Statistics for Main Variables
All sample (1990-2002)








  47  Tobin's q MB Ratio ROA Concent Coincid DGroup Dafp LAEC DE Ratio Cash Invest Volume
Number of obs. 120 116 202 203 126 237 237 128 123 174 178 101
Mean 1.43 1.59 6.8% 58.4% 39.8% 0.55 0.47 17.62 0.79 22.1% 10.2% 177948
Median 1.20 1.37 6.2% 60.6% 36.7% 1.00 0.00 17.66 0.36 21.5% 5.6% 2879
Max 4.67 6.27 33.9% 100.0% 98.0% 1.00 1.00 22.97 35.55 75.8% 86.9% 8008483
Min 0.40 0.04 -35.8% 2.4% 0.4% 0.00 0.00 8.74 0.00 -37.0% -24.3% 0
Stan. Deviation 0.80 1.07 8.1% 24.5% 22.4% 0.50 0.50 2.18 3.21 19.7% 19.2% 897931
Number of obs. 173 171 211 211 183 237 237 186 181 164 183 144
Mean 1.22 1.33 5.6% 58.9% 37.5% 0.56 0.48 17.71 0.96 22.1% 9.6% 110663
Median 1.00 0.99 4.9% 61.3% 33.9% 1.00 0.00 17.75 0.46 19.2% 5.0% 7623
Max 3.93 6.08 27.5% 99.8% 95.8% 1.00 1.00 22.30 21.63 92.2% 93.9% 3997243
Min 0.42 0.06 -38.7% 2.4% 1.0% 0.00 0.00 8.43 0.00 -35.2% -23.6% 0
Stan. Deviation 0.63 1.00 8.1% 24.9% 21.0% 0.50 0.50 1.93 2.17 19.8% 19.9% 498631
Number of obs. 173 171 212 211 183 237 237 186 181 169 192 136
Mean 1.22 1.33 4.7% 58.9% 37.5% 0.56 0.48 17.71 0.96 19.5% 6.4% 119914
Median 1.00 0.99 4.7% 61.3% 33.9% 1.00 0.00 17.75 0.46 17.8% 3.6% 7175
Max 3.93 6.08 31.1% 99.8% 95.8% 1.00 1.00 22.30 21.63 90.5% 79.4% 4845584
Min 0.42 0.06 -42.8% 2.4% 1.0% 0.00 0.00 8.43 0.00 -27.3% -38.6% 0
Stan. Deviation 0.63 1.00 8.6% 24.9% 21.0% 0.50 0.50 1.93 2.17 19.6% 18.0% 522536
Number of obs. 172 169 216 213 186 237 237 189 184 165 185 122
Mean 1.05 1.03 4.0% 60.7% 35.1% 0.57 0.48 17.56 1.37 17.5% 2.1% 148478
Median 0.88 0.77 3.8% 62.7% 31.0% 1.00 0.00 17.63 0.72 16.4% 0.3% 3024
Max 4.46 5.98 29.5% 100.0% 98.0% 1.00 1.00 22.45 26.37 80.4% 94.3% 4475889
Min 0.41 0.07 -20.9% 2.4% 2.4% 0.00 0.00 8.44 0.00 -33.7% -39.1% 0
Stan. Deviation 0.61 0.84 7.7% 24.0% 21.2% 0.50 0.50 1.96 2.53 19.0% 16.3% 619599
Number of obs. 175 173 220 215 185 237 237 188 184 161 190 128
Mean 1.11 1.17 4.1% 61.1% 36.6% 0.57 0.48 17.71 1.36 19.2% 2.3% 90781
Median 0.95 0.91 3.6% 63.1% 33.3% 1.00 0.00 17.76 0.58 18.1% -1.1% 2633
Max 3.55 4.68 28.5% 100.0% 98.0% 1.00 1.00 22.86 22.87 69.2% 95.1% 3840981
Min 0.42 0.07 -24.2% 0.5% 0.2% 0.00 0.00 8.45 0.00 -23.0% -36.1% 0
Stan. Deviation 0.59 0.91 7.2% 24.3% 21.0% 0.50 0.50 2.04 2.66 16.8% 17.1% 421632
Number of obs. 178 176 216 222 186 237 237 189 185 190 199 141
Mean 1.02 1.05 3.7% 61.5% 35.1% 0.56 0.48 17.74 1.72 11.4% 3.7% 109526
Median 0.88 0.79 4.3% 62.9% 31.6% 1.00 0.00 17.75 0.61 8.4% -0.5% 3077
Max 3.72 4.73 29.8% 100.0% 98.0% 1.00 1.00 22.82 28.18 90.7% 82.6% 4402062
Min 0.40 0.04 -46.8% 2.6% 2.6% 0.00 0.00 8.46 0.00 0.4% -36.6% 0
Stan. Deviation 0.53 0.88 8.4% 24.2% 21.4% 0.50 0.50 2.09 3.49 13.5% 17.6% 463807
Number of obs. 181 178 205 214 187 237 237 193 186 182 182 142
Mean 1.07 1.15 4.2% 60.3% 34.4% 0.56 0.48 17.82 1.84 9.9% -0.7% 87934
Median 0.94 0.87 4.4% 61.3% 30.7% 1.00 0.00 17.83 0.73 7.9% -1.4% 2321
Max 3.27 5.77 28.2% 100.0% 99.7% 1.00 1.00 22.89 39.88 61.4% 57.0% 2363277
Min 0.40 0.04 -54.9% 0.0% 0.1% 0.00 0.00 11.68 0.00 0.1% -39.1% 0
Stan. Deviation 0.52 0.98 8.6% 24.0% 21.9% 0.50 0.50 2.06 4.19 8.7% 13.6% 349906
Table 6 (cont.)
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Tobin's q 1
MB Ratio 0.94 * 1
ROA 0.33 * 0.40 * 1
Concent -0.13 * -0.11 * 0.02 1
Coincid 0.20 * 0.22 * 0.15 * 0.69 * 1
DGroup -0.01 0.02 0.13 * -0.15 * -0.11 * 1
Dafp 0.13 * 0.18 * 0.25 * -0.11 * -0.04 0.39 * 1
LAEC 0.08 * 0.14 * 0.17 * -0.07 * -0.10 * 0.46 * 0.55 * 1
DE Ratio -0.24 * -0.28 * -0.17 * 0.10 * -0.35 * 0.01 -0.11 * 0.01 1
Cash 0.32 * 0.37 * 0.64 * 0.01 0.17 * 0.05 * 0.20 * 0.05 * -0.13 * 1
Invest 0.15 * 0.17 * 0.21 * -0.03 0.04 0.08 * 0.14 * 0.17 * -0.11 * 0.25 * 1
Volume -0.07 * -0.07 * -0.07 * -0.18 * -0.18 * 0.12 * -0.03 0.14 * 0.05 -0.03 0.05 1
Table 7
Correlation Matrix for Main Variables
Tobin's q MB Ratio ROA Concent Coincid DGroup Dafp LAEC DE Ratio Cash Invest Volume
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1
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Concent -0.330 - -1.431 - - -1.404
-4.8 - -13.0 -- -12.5
0.0% - 0.0% -- 0.0%
Coincid - 0.266 1.755 - - 1.728
- 3.0 12.4 -- 12.1
- 0.2% 0.0% -- 0.0%
DGroup - - - 0.049 - -0.017
--- 1.2 - -0.4
--- 21.7% - 66.0%
Dafp ---- 0 . 1 4 5 0 . 0 8
---- 3.6 2.1
---- 0.0% 3.8%
LAEC 0.052 0.065 0.051 0.056 0.043 0.043
5.4 6.7 5.4 5.2 4.0 3.9
0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
DE Ratio -0.061 -0.053 0.015 -0.063 -0.058 0.017
-7.5 -6.1 1.6 -7.8 -7.1 1.7
0.0% 0.0% 11.7% 0.0% 0.0% 8.3%
Cash 0.953 0.903 0.790 0.945 0.920 0.781
10.1 9.5 8.8 10.0 9.8 8.6
0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
Invest 0.117 0.125 0.076 0.127 0.128 0.078
1.3 1.4 0.9 1.4 1.4 0.9
20.1% 17.1% 37.9% 16.7% 16.3% 37.0%
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of obs 1413 1418 1413 1418 1418 1413
F( 29,  1383) 33.8 33.0 41.7 32.5 33.2 39.1
Prob > F 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
R-squared 0.388 0.381 0.449 0.378 0.383 0.450
Adj R-squared 0.376 0.370 0.438 0.366 0.371 0.439
Root MSE 0.568 0.571 0.540 0.572 0.570 0.539
Table 8
OLS Pooled Regressions for Coincidence of Cash and Control Rights on 
Tobin's q
Annual data from 1990 to 2002 for 177 companies Tobin's q
M to B 
Ratio ROA
Concent -1.404 -1.772 -0.040
-12.5 -9.6 -3.9
0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
Coincid 1.728 2.348 0.070
12.1 10.0 5.5
0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
DGroup -0.017 -0.043 0.011
-0.4 -0.7 2.9
66.0% 48.7% 0.4%
Dafp 0.081 0.111 0.014
2.1 1.7 3.8
3.8% 8.3% 0.0%
LAEC 0.043 0.109 -0.001
3.9 6.1 -1.0
0.0% 0.0% 29.7%
DE Ratio 0.017 -0.026 -0.003
1.7 -1.5 -3.6
8.3% 13.0% 0.0%
Cash 0.781 1.551 0.257
8.6 10.4 30.7
0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
Invest 0.078 0.161 -0.015
0.9 1.1 -1.8
37.0% 25.5% 6.6%
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes
Number of obs 1413 1401 1467
F( 29,  1383) 39.1 37.7 62.3
Prob > F 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
R-squared 0.450 0.443 0.557
Adj R-squared 0.439 0.432 0.548
Root MSE 0.539 0.875 0.051
Table 9
OLS Pooled Regressions for Coincidence of 
Cash and Control Rights on Different 
Indicators of Firm Valuation and 
Performance
Annual data from 1990 to 2002 for 177 companies 
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1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Concent -2.967 -2.174 -2.938 -2.731 -3.829 -1.742 -1.153 -1.121 -0.877 -0.825 -1.055 -0.965
-3.0 -3.6 -4.2 -3.6 -3.2 -2.1 -4.5 -4.3 -2.1 -2.8 -3.7 -3.8
0.3% 0.1% 0.0% 0.1% 0.2% 3.8% 0.0% 0.0% 3.4% 0.6% 0.0% 0.0%
Coincid 3.099 2.126 3.157 3.284 4.546 2.259 1.427 1.241 1.543 1.216 1.313 1.515
2 . 52 . 93 . 73 . 63 . 12 . 14 . 23 . 52 . 72 . 93 . 74 . 6
1.5% 0.5% 0.0% 0.1% 0.2% 3.6% 0.0% 0.1% 0.8% 0.5% 0.0% 0.0%
DGroup -0.070 -0.187 -0.244 0.376 0.119 -0.078 0.019 -0.014 -0.040 0.048 -0.078 0.024
-0.3 -1.0 -1.2 1.8 0.6 -0.5 0.2 -0.2 -0.4 0.5 -0.8 0.3
76.8% 32.0% 24.9% 7.4% 55.8% 65.0% 83.2% 87.8% 71.7% 63.0% 41.3% 79.2%
Dafp 0.239 0.054 0.223 0.127 0.213 -0.084 -0.074 -0.029 -0.029 0.046 0.037 0.100
1.1 0.3 1.1 0.6 1.1 -0.5 -0.8 -0.3 -0.2 0.4 0.3 1.0
29.6% 77.2% 28.0% 56.7% 28.0% 62.6% 42.6% 75.7% 81.2% 66.8% 73.2% 32.7%
LAEC 0.068 0.053 0.091 0.084 -0.043 0.076 0.014 0.032 -0.001 0.022 0.030 0.031
1.0 1.0 1.6 1.6 -0.8 1.6 0.5 1.2 0.0 0.8 1.1 1.2
30.0% 31.0% 10.9% 11.7% 42.4% 11.3% 63.3% 24.9% 98.2% 45.0% 26.7% 22.7%
DE Ratio 0.203 0.124 0.130 0.180 0.651 -0.146 -0.023 -0.019 0.024 0.008 0.013 0.007
0.9 1.9 2.4 2.3 1.8 -0.7 -1.3 -1.0 0.4 0.2 0.6 0.4
38.1% 5.6% 1.8% 2.4% 7.6% 49.1% 21.3% 31.6% 71.4% 86.0% 55.8% 70.9%
Cash 1.672 1.203 1.744 1.500 0.878 0.155 1.115 0.883 0.250 0.672 -0.264 0.236
3.7 3.1 3.4 3.3 2.1 0.4 5.0 4.1 0.9 2.5 -0.8 0.4
0.0% 0.2% 0.1% 0.2% 4.2% 68.1% 0.0% 0.0% 37.4% 1.5% 41.6% 69.0%
Invest -0.251 -0.020 0.168 0.106 -0.238 -0.089 0.048 0.259 -0.252 0.100 0.229 0.246
-0.4 -0.1 0.3 0.3 -0.6 -0.2 0.2 1.2 -0.9 0.4 1.0 0.8
69.2% 95.1% 74.3% 79.8% 56.9% 81.8% 83.8% 22.4% 35.1% 69.3% 34.4% 43.6%
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of obs 97 96 97 93 99 104 132 136 132 131 153 143
F 3 . 23 . 84 . 85 . 33 . 83 . 98 . 88 . 43 . 04 . 43 . 74 . 1
Prob > F 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
R-squared 0.421 0.469 0.524 0.563 0.463 0.449 0.584 0.564 0.320 0.412 0.330 0.372
Adj R-squared 0.287 0.345 0.414 0.457 0.343 0.332 0.517 0.497 0.212 0.317 0.240 0.280
Root MSE 0.718 0.590 0.672 0.652 0.657 0.607 0.388 0.402 0.470 0.429 0.466 0.438
Table 10
OLS Cross Section Regressions for Coincidence of Cash and Control Rights on Tobin's q
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A-B
OLS GLS Random Fixed Dynamic
Het. Corr. Effects Effects Panel
Tobin's q (-1) 0.108
5.3
0.0%
Concent -1.404 -1.224 -1.913 -2.046 -1.321
-12.5 -18.8 -14.3 -13.9 -6.9
0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
Coincid 1.728 1.702 2.770 3.056 1.668
12.1 19.4 17.3 17.6 7.0
0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
DGroup -0.017 -0.010 -0.225 -0.445 -0.088
-0.4 -0.5 -2.7 -2.1 -0.3
66.0% 62.5% 0.7% 3.3% 79.6%
Dafp 0.081 0.078 -0.105 -0.154
2.1 4.0 -2.1 -2.7
3.8% 0.0% 3.7% 0.7%
LAEC 0.043 0.056 0.146 0.244 0.768
3 . 98 . 37 . 79 . 4 2 4 . 5
0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
DE Ratio 0.017 0.026 0.021 0.021 0.018
1 . 70 . 02 . 52 . 42 . 4
8.3% 0.0% 1.3% 1.5% 1.6%
Cash 0.781 0.789 0.762 0.790 0.116
8.6 14.1 9.2 9.1 1.7
0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 8.1%
Invest 0.078 -0.002 0.033 -0.004 -0.134
0.9 -0.1 0.5 -0.1 -3.0
37.0% 96.1% 62.5% 95.1% 0.2%
Industry dummies Yes No No No
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes No
Number of obs 1413 1413 1413 1413 1413
Number of groups 177 177 177 177
F( 29,  1383) 39.1 82.5
Prob > F 0.0% 0.0%
Wald chi2 3215.8 1833.9 1415.0




Panel Regressions for Coincidence of Cash and Control Rights 
on Tobin's q
Annual data from 1990 to 2002 for 177 companies 
  53  (1) (2) (3) (4) (6)
Concent -1.788 - -1.295 -3.057 -3.262
-5.7 - -11.0 -9.7 -7.7
0.0% - 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
Concent2 1.314 - - 1.447 1.595
4.8 -- 5.6 4.8
0.0% -- 0.0% 0.0%
Coincid - -1.716 0.682 1.760 2.098
- -5.2 1.7 12.4 4.3
- 0.0% 8.2% 0.0% 0.0%
Coincid2 - 2.240 1.050 - -0.336
- 6.3 2.9 - -0.7
- 0.0% 0.4% - 46.8%
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of obs 1413 1418 1413 1413 1413
F( 29,  1383) 32.1 32.5 38.3 39.6 38.4
Prob > F 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
R-squared 0.402 0.405 0.454 0.463 0.463
Adj R-squared 0.390 0.392 0.442 0.451 0.451
Root MSE 0.562 0.560 0.538 0.533 0.533
Table 12
OLS Pooled Regressions for Coincidence of Cash and Control 
Rights on Tobin's q: Non-linear relationships explored
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OLS First Second OLS First Second
Stage Stage Stage Stage
Dep. Variable Tobin's q Coincid Tobin's q Tobin's q Coincid Tobin's q
Dconc 0.074 0.254 0.216
1.4 31.5 21.6
15.9% 0.0% 0.0%
Concent -1.524 -0.430 -0.978 -0.269
-10.8 -3.8 -9.7 -2.5
0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 1.3%
Coincid 1.727 0.301 1.309 0.234
12.1 1.4 10.2 1.0
0.0% 16.7% 0.0% 31.4%
DGroup -0.013 0.005 0.012 -0.001 0.000 0.013
-0.3 0.5 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.4
73.8% 59.5% 76.3% 98.2% 98.4% 72.0%
Volume 0.000 0.000 0.000
-3.2 -3.0 -3.1
0.1% 0.3% 0.2%
Dafp 0.080 0.014 0.123 0.101 0.017 0.140
2.1 1.4 3.0 2.8 1.5 3.7
4.0% 15.6% 0.3% 0.5% 14.3% 0.0%
LAEC 0.045 0.005 0.037 0.032 -0.006 0.027
4.1 2.0 3.2 3.1 -1.8 2.4
0.0% 4.9% 0.1% 0.2% 7.4% 1.5%
DE Ratio 0.017 -0.033 -0.046 0.002 -0.040 -0.039
1.7 -20.3 -4.3 0.2 -18.0 -3.5
9.0% 0.0% 0.0% 84.8% 0.0% 0.1%
Cash 0.793 0.145 0.911 0.585 0.086 0.666
8.7 6.4 9.4 6.7 3.0 7.2
0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.3% 0.0%
Invest 0.078 0.011 0.116 0.256 0.024 0.305
0.9 0.5 1.3 3.1 0.9 3.5
36.8% 61.9% 20.5% 0.2% 38.2% 0.1%
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of obs 1413 1481 1413 915 928 915
F( 29,  1383) 37.9 58.6 30.9 41.3 41.8 33.5
Prob > F 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
R-squared 0.451 0.531 0.393 0.557 0.547 0.505
Adj R-squared 0.439 0.522 0.380 0.543 0.534 0.490
Root MSE 0.539 0.141 0.567 0.393 0.133 0.415
IV Estimation IV Estimation
Table 13
2SLS Instrumental Variables Estimation for Coincidence of Cash Flow and Control 
Rights on Tobin's q
Instrument: Concentration dummy
(1990 - 2002)  (1994 - 2002) 
  55  Group 0.080 0.077 0.077 0.109
0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 6.2%
Coincidence -0.083 -0.050 -0.030 0.010
19.9% 44.2% 63.8% 91.3%
Coincidence*Group -0.058
58.5%
Pension Fund 0.100 0.103
0.0% 0.0%
Tobin's q 0.155 0.150 0.155 0.143 0.140
0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.1%
Tobin's q*Group -0.001
99.0%
Cash flow 0.578 0.552 0.581 0.564 0.715
1.7% 2.3% 1.6% 1.9% 3.2%
Cash flow*Group -0.235
48.3%
Assets -0.002 0.004 -0.002 -0.013 -0.011
79.8% 50.4% 71.6% 5.8% 10.7%
Debt -0.387 -0.452 -0.417 -0.381 -0.357
0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
Time dummies Y e sY e sY e sY e sY e s
Industry dummies Y e sY e sY e sY e sY e s
Wald test 412.25 398.12 413.06 436.21 420.65
p 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
Number of comp. 178 178 178 178 177
Number of obs. 1117 1117 1117 1117 1085
Generalized Least Squares, Heterocedasticity Corrected
Table 14
Dividend Pay-out Ratio and Coincidence of Cash-flow-rights to Control-rights 
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Random Fixed Generalized Panel Tobit Panel Tobit
Effects Effects Least Squares LC=0 LC=0.3
Group 0.201 0.137 0.230 0.244 0.330
6.0% 37.2% 0.0% 8.9% 2.6%
Coincidence 0.969 1.239 1.108 1.445 1.504
2.2% 1.8% 0.0% 0.9% 0.7%
(Coincidence)2 -1.157 -1.473 -1.177 -1.653 -1.676
1.1% 0.9% 0.0% 0.5% 0.4%
Coincidence*Group -0.683 -1.245 -0.832 -1.064 -1.169
15.1% 2.9% 0.3% 8.3% 5.8%
(Coincidence)2*Group 0.694 1.232 0.805 1.037 1.176
19.1% 5.8% 1.3% 12.1% 7.9%
Tobin's q 0.045 -0.112 0.112 -0.047 0.029
35.5% 8.7% 0.0% 44.6% 63.2%
Tobin's q*Group -0.025 0.007 0.031 -0.021 -0.043
62.8% 91.8% 28.5% 73.5% 47.2%
Cash flow 0.409 0.210 0.595 0.762 0.363
17.5% 49.7% 0.1% 4.3% 31.7%
Cash flow*Group -0.123 -0.039 -0.077 -0.291 -0.258
68.6% 90.1% 70.9% 43.4% 46.8%
Assets 0.000 0.053 -0.003 0.042 -0.002
97.1% 9.3% 52.3% 0.1% 90.6%
Debt -0.396 -0.456 -0.333 -0.665 -0.478
0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
Pension Fund 0.110 0.017 0.099 0.133 0.173
0.8% 89.2% 0.0% 0.5% 0.4%
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry dummies Yes No Yes Yes Yes
Alpha 0.418564 0.420593 0.470804 0.436994 0.448524
Alpha*Group 0.308586 -0.011778 0.371893 0.309425 0.334579
Wald test 168.5 1368.6 221.0 167.4
p 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
F test 3.9
p 0
Sigma ui 19.2% 30.1% 0.251
Sigma e 25.1% 28.4% 0.260
Number of comp. 177 177 177 177 177
Number of obs. 1085 1085 1085 1085 1085
Table 15
Dividend Pay-out Ratio and Coincidence of Cash-flow-rights to Control-rights 
(Chile: 1994 - 2002)
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Tobin's q Separ. Disclos. Board Share. Conflict CGI Assets Debt Pension F.
Tobin's q 100.0%
Separation 27.9% 100.0%
Disclosure -0.5% 4.6% 100.0%
Board 8.9% -3.3% 28.9% 100.0%
Shareholders -0.6% -2.1% -14.8% 5.8% 100.0%
Conflict 16.7% 5.1% 23.8% 34.3% -11.2% 100.0%
CGI 6.7% 0.5% 61.9% 76.1% 19.9% 66.9% 100.0%
Assets 8.8% -18.5% 11.7% 10.7% 25.7% -17.3% 9.5% 100.0%
Debt -45.8% -71.9% -4.9% -9.6% 10.8% -17.9% -10.6% 23.3% 100.0%
Pension Fund 19.2% 1.3% -0.3% 4.7% 3.7% -14.3% -7.8% 47.5% 3.3% 100.0%
Chile, 2003
Table 16
Pairwise Correlations of Key Variables
  58  CGI Disclos. Board Share. Conflict(*)
Assets 0.294 0.208 0.283 0.320 -0.016
0.9% 9.4% 1.5% 0.7%
Debt -1.631 -0.866 -1.685 0.182 -1.740
5.6% 37.4% 6.7% 83.8%
ROA 1.254 2.900 2.249 -1.733 -0.162
42.6% 14.1% 22.8% 34.2%
Liquidity -2.758 -2.891 -1.546 2.255 -2.371
13.7% 18.3% 44.3% 27.2%
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of obs. 100 100 100 100 100
LR chi2(14) 24.98 24.16 25 20.2 35.46
P Value 0.0347 0.0438 0.0346 0.1241 0.0013
Pseudo R2 0.0601 0.1107 0.0928 0.085 0.1683
(*) Convergence not achieved.
Table 17
Ordered Logit Regressions of CG Indices on Control Variables
Chile, 2003
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OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS First Second
Stage Stage
Tobin's q Tobin's q Tobin's q Tobin's q Tobin's q Tobin's q Conflict Tobin's q
DSize 0.367
18.3%
Source -0.218 0.022 0.032 -0.067 -0.032 0.026 0.497 -0.050











Concent -0.749 -0.768 -0.743 -0.764 -0.717 -0.750 -0.133 -0.708
1.6% 2.2% 2.7% 1.8% 2.5% 2.5% 83.2% 4.1%
Coincid 0.898 0.846 0.835 0.906 0.822 0.836 -0.007 0.816
0.2% 0.7% 0.9% 0.3% 0.7% 0.9% 99.0% 1.1%
DGroup -0.018 -0.101 -0.103 -0.085 -0.055 -0.101 -0.354 -0.044
84.7% 31.7% 30.6% 38.4% 57.2% 31.6% 7.0% 78.0%
DAFP 0.091 0.210 0.216 0.152 0.194 0.217 0.134 0.188
43.7% 8.7% 7.6% 21.0% 9.6% 7.4% 55.7% 16.3%
LAEC 0.027 0.009 0.009 0.029 0.006 0.008 -0.034 0.005
37.5% 77.2% 77.2% 36.6% 84.1% 80.1% 66.5% 88.6%
DE Ratio -0.002 -0.012 -0.014 -0.007 -0.013 -0.013 0.014 -0.013
86.0% 41.7% 35.2% 64.5% 33.9% 35.4% 63.0% 35.9%
Cash 0.825 0.752 0.618 1.725 -0.287 0.567 7.180 -0.542
70.7% 74.3% 79.1% 44.6% 89.8% 81.0% 10.2% 87.8%
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of obs 85 85 85 85 85 85 85 85
F( 29,  1383) 3.0 2.3 2.3 2.7 2.8 2.3 2.4 2.3
Prob > F 0.0% 0.8% 0.8% 0.2% 0.1% 0.8% 0.4% 0.8%
R-squared 0.517 0.398 0.397 0.436 0.449 0.397 0.416 0.398
Adj R-squared 0.345 0.222 0.220 0.272 0.288 0.221 0.245 0.222
Root MSE 0.330 0.359 0.360 0.348 0.344 0.360 0.680 0.359
IV Estimation
Table 18
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